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PARTY NAMES ON THE NOTICE OF APPEAL: STRICT
ADHERENCE TO FEDERAL APPELLATE RULE 3




In Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co.,' the Supreme Court held that
where a notice of appeal fails to adequately describe all appealing par-
ties, a court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal of the unnamed parties.
2
Despite Torres, federal circuit courts continuously receive notices of ap-
peal that fail to specifically name the appealing parties. Recently, the
Tenth Circuit in Storage Technology Corp. v. United States District Court 3 held
that each appealing party must be specifically named in the notice of
appeal or in a functionally equivalent document that is filed within the
time period required for a notice of appeal.4 The Tenth Circuit's ex-
traordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus, which ordered the district
court to dismiss approximately 68 appellants not named in the notice of
appeal, underscored its strong belief that the notice of appeal must be
absolutely unambiguous. 5 Despite the import of Torres and its progeny
and the ease with which Rule 3(c) is satisfied, deficient notices of appeal
are continuously filed and unnamed parties suffer the harsh conse-
quences of dismissal for failure to comply with Rule 3(c) requirements.
6
II. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS UNDERLYING FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 3
"The notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the
appeal; shall designate the judgment, order or part thereof appealed
from; and shall name the court to which the appeal is taken." 7 The Ad-
visory Committee Notes to Rule 3 indicate that "[b]ecause the timely
filing of a notice of appeal is 'mandatory and jurisdictional,' compliance
* NancyJ. Gegenheimer, Partner, Holme Roberts & Owen, Denver, Colorado; B.A.
University of Colorado at Boulder, 1975; J.D. University of Denver, 1978. Ms.
Gegenheimer specializes in trial and appellate work. The author wishes to thank Sheryl A.
Rogers, Associate, Holme Roberts & Owen, for her assistance with this Article.
1. 487 U.S. 312 (1988).
2. Id. at 314.
3. 934 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1991).
4. Id. at 248.
5. Id. at 248 (an appellate court can not be relegated to the vagaries of belatedly
trying to determine who the appropriate appealing parties may be).
6. Torres, 487 U.S. at 318 (harshness of the result is imposed by the legislature and
not by the judicial process).
7. FED. R. App. P. 3(c) (Rule 3 and Rule 4 combined require timely filing).
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with the provisions of [the] rules is of the utmost importance."'8 In the
past, however, courts have dispensed with literal compliance with the
rules in cases where the time of filing can not fairly be exacted.9 Such an
approach restates the provisions found in Civil Procedure Rule 5(c)' °
and Criminal Procedure Rule 37.1 1 Accordingly, courts have historically
placed substance over form in construing the contents of the notice of
appeal. 12
Recognizing this judicial preference, one well known authority on
federal practice and procedure writes:
Defects in the wording of the notice of appeal are generally
overlooked if the true intentions of the appellant can fairly be
ascertained, if the courts have not been misled, and if the other
parties have suffered no prejudice. The notice is not to be
parsed on a technical basis; nor is the appellant to be deprived
of his right to appeal because he has misspelled a party's name
or misdesignated the court to which the appeal is being
taken. 
1 3
Courts therefore, in the interest of expediting decisions or for other
good cause shown, may suspend the requirements of the appellate rules
in a particular case on application of a party or on its own motion, and
the court may order proceedings in accordance with its direction.
14
While the courts may exercise their power to enlarge the time pre-
scribed by the rules to do "any act," Rule 26(b) strictly prohibits enlarg-
ing the time permitted for filing a notice of appeal.' 5 Upon a showing of
excusable neglect or good cause, however, Rule 4(a)(5) permits the dis-
trict court to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon a motion
filed not later than 30 days after the time prescribed by Rule 4(a).' 6 The
8. Id. (advisory committee note citing United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 224
(1960)). See also PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE UNrrED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
TENTH ClRcurr 13 (1989) ("[p]rescribed times for filing a notice of appeal are jurisdic-
tional and may not be extended by the court of appeals.").
9. Id. See, e.g., Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139, 144 (1964) (notice of appeal by
a prisoner, in the form of a letter, delivered to prison authorities for mailing well within
the time fixed for appeal, was held timely filed notwithstanding that it was received by the
clerk after expiration of the time for appeal; the appellant "did all he could" to effect
timely filing); Richey v. Wilkins, 335 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1964) (notice filed in the court of
appeals by a prisoner without assistance of counsel held sufficient); Halfen v. United
States, 324 F.2d 52 (10th Cir. 1963) (notice mailed to district judge in time to have been
received by him in normal course held sufficient); Riffle v. United States, 299 F.2d 802 (5th
Cir. 1962) (letter by prisoner to judge of court of appeals held sufficient).
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 5(c).
11. FED. R. CRIM. P. 37.
12. See, e.g., Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974).
13. 16 CHARLES WRIGHT, KENNETH A. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 3949, 355-56 (1977) [hereinafter.WRIGHT] citing Hoiness v. United States, 335
U.S. 297 (1948); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) (the Supreme Court has insisted
that notices of appeal are to be construed liberally rather than hypertechnically). How-
ever, not all courts adopted a liberal construction of Rule 3(c). See, e.g., Van Hoose v.
Eidson, 450 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1971); Farley Transp. Co. v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
778 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1985).
14. FED. R. App. P. 2.
15. FED. R. App. P. 26(b).
16. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) (the 1991 amendment to FED. R. App. P. 4, which added
subdivision 6, permits a district court to reopen the time for appeal for a period of 14 days
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Tenth Circuit has strictly construed excusable neglect and does not ex-
tend it to palpable mistakes by lawyers that are merely too busy,17 how-
ever, the Fifth Circuit does indicate that there should be flexibility in
granting extensions of time to file a notice of appeal.' 8 For these rea-
sons, if a defective notice of appeal is filed omitting the name of one or
more appellants, and an appellant attempts to use the extension pro-
vided for in Rule 4(a)(5) to cure the notice of appeal, a motion for leave
to amend the notice to include the unnamed parties must be filed within
the time limit for filing the notice of appeal.' 9 If the appellant fails to
file the motion to amend within the prescribed time period, the court
will not have jurisdiction over the unnamed parties.
20
As an example, the First Circuit in In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel
Fire Litigation,21 allowed an extension of time to file a notice of appeal
under Rule 4(a)(5) because the appellant had failed to specifically name
all parties. 22 The original notice of appeal designated the appellant as
"Plaintiffs Steering Committee" but had failed to specifically name all
2,000 appellants. The appellants sought leave in the district court pur-
suant to Rule 4(a)(5), to extend the original filing time so that a cor-
rected notice of appeal specifically listing each appellant's name could
be filed. In affirming the district court's grant of a time extension, the
First Circuit found that the appellants' conduct may have been "excusa-
ble" in that: (1) the notice may have been adequate as filed since the
Steering Committee by its very nature represented all plaintiffs; (2) the
plaintiffs group was of extraordinary size; and (3) the original notice was
reasonable under the circumstances. 23 Additionally, the district court
had jurisdiction to consider the motion for extension of time because
the defective notice of appeal did not deprive it ofjurisdiction over the
unnamed parties who, in effect, had not appealed.
24
from the date of entry of the order reopening the time for appeal if the district court finds:
(a) that a party entitled to notice of the entry of a judgment or order did not receive such
notice from the clerk or any party within 21 days of its entry, and (b) that no party would
be prejudiced by reopening. The motion to reopen must be filed within 180 days of the
entry ofjudgment or within 7 days of receipt of notice from the clerk, whichever is earlier.
FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(6)).
17. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Conner, 382 F.2d 13 (10th Cir. 1967) "The Committee
intended that the standard of excusable neglect remain a strict one, however. [lit is not
meant to cover the usual excuse that the lawyer is too busy .... " Id. at 16.
18. Chipser v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 600 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1979). Under amended
Rule 4(a), flexibility is intended in the granting of extensions but the amendment does not
apply in this case. Id. at 1063 n.2.
19. Because of the limited circumstance set forth in FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), this subdi-
vision would not assist an appellant who failed to designate the appealing parties. See supra
note 16.
20. Kowaleski v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs, 879 F.2d
1173, 1177 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990) (citing Torres v. Oakland
Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 (1988)).
21. 888 F.2d 940 (Ist Cir. 1989).
22. Id. at 942.
23. Id. Cf. 650 Park Ave. Corp. v. McRae, 836 F.2d 764, 767 (2d Cir. 1988) (excusable
neglect must be based either on acts of someone other than appellant or his counsel or
some extraordinary event).
24. Id. See Baylis v. Marriott Corp., 906 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1990); Torres, 487 U.S. at
317 (courts of appeal have no jurisdiction over parties not named in an appeal).
1992]
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Rule 4(a)(4) provides that if a timely post-trial motion is filed in the
district court by any party under Rule 59, the time for filing an appeal
runs from entry of an order granting or denying the motion.25 A notice
of appeal filed before the disposition of the motion has no effect. 26 A
new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured
from the entry of the order denying the Rule 59 motion. Rule 4(a) re-
quires that a notice of appeal be filed 30 days after a final judgment or
order, except the United States or an officer or agency thereof has 60
days.2 7 Unfortunately, a combination of the language from the Advisory
Committee's Notes suggesting that literal compliance is not required,
the Notes' reliance on opinions which liberally construe the require-
ments of Rule 3(c), and the language from Wright 28 have caused appel-
lants to relax the vigilance required in filing a notice of appeal. Of
paramount importance in the Advisory Committee's language is that the
timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory andjurisdictional. 2 9 This
means that a defective notice of appeal can not be cured after the time
for filing because this would be the equivalent of extending the time for
filing a notice of appeal.
3 0
III. TORRES V. OAKLAND SCAVENGER Co.
Jose Torres was one of sixteen plaintiffs who intervened in an em-
ployment discrimination suit after receiving notice of the action pursu-
ant to a settlement agreement between Oakland Scavenger and the
original plaintiffs. After the district court dismissed the intervenors'
complaint, Mr. Torres filed an appeal in the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and re-
manded the case for further proceedings.3 l The result of a clerical error
by the secretary ofJose Torres's attorney, was the omission of Torres's
name from both the notice of appeal and the order of the court of ap-
peals.3 2 On remand, Oakland Scavenger moved for a partial summary
judgment against Mr. Torres arguing that the prior dismissal was final
by virtue of Torres's failure to appeal.3 3 The district court granted Oak-
land Scavenger's motion and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that
"[u]nless a party is named in the notice of appeal, the appellate court
does not have jurisdiction over him."'3 4 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in order to resolve the conflict among the circuits as to
25. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(iv). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 59.
26. Barnett v. Petro-Tex Chemical Corp., 893 F.2d 800, 804 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 110 S. Ct. 3274 (1990) (pendency of motion renders notice of appeal nullity).
27. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(1).
28. See supra text accompanying note 13.
29. FED. R. App. P. 3 (advisory committee's note).
30. Torres, 487 U.S. at 315 (permitting courts to exercise jurisdiction over unnamed
parties after time for filing notice has passed is equivalent to permitting courts to ex-
tending time for filing notice of appeal).
31. Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1982).
32. Torres, 487 U.S. at 313.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 314 (quoting Martinez v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 807 F.2d 178 (9th Cir.
1986)).
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whether a failure to file a notice of appeal in accordance with the speci-
ficity requirements of Rule 3(c), presents a jurisdictional bar to the
appeal.
3 5
The Supreme Court held that the specificity requirement of Rule
3(c) is met only by some designation that gives fair notice of the specific
individual or entity seeking to appeal.3 6 Failure to name a party in the
notice of appeal constitutes a failure of that party to timely file a notice
of appeal.3 7 Failure to timely file a notice of appeal deprives the court of
jurisdiction.3 8 Accordingly, an appeal is not perfected where a party:
(1) was never named or otherwise designated on the notice of appeal;
(2) did not file the functional equivalent of the notice of appeal; and (3)
did not seek leave to amend the notice of appeal within the time limit
prescribed by Rule 4.39 In so holding, the Court noted that although
Rule 2 gives courts the power "for good cause" to suspend the require-
ments of the rules, courts may not waive the jurisdictional requirements
of Rules 3 and 4.40 The Court recognized that construing Rule 3(c) as a
jurisdictional prerequisite would occasionally lead to a harsh result, but
held this was the only manner in which to ensure that both the opposi-
tion and the court could be certain of the identity of the appellants.
4 1
The last sentence to Rule 3(c) states that "[a]n appeal shall not be dis-
missed for informality of form or title of the notice of appeal."'4 2 The
Supreme Court explained that the Advisory Committee Note stating
"the court should dispense with literal compliance in cases in which it
cannot fairly be exacted" refers generally to cases later addressed by the
1979 amendment. 43 Permitting imperfect but substantial compliance
with a technical requirement is not the same as waiving the requirement
altogether as a jurisdictional threshold.
4 4
Strict compliance with Rule 3 is of utmost importance because juris-
dictional hurdles can never be waived by a court.4 5 No party need raise
the jurisdiction question because it is the duty of the court to determine,
sua sponte, whether it has jurisdiction over a case before it.46 Accord-
35. Torres, 487 U.S. at 314 n.1 (comparing Farley Transp. Co. v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 778 F.2d 1365, 1368-1370 (9th Cir. 1985) (failure to specify party to appeal is
jurisdictional bar); Covington v. Allsbrook, 636 F.2d 63, 64 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 914 (1981); Life Time Doors, Inc. v. Walled Lake Door Co. 505 F.2d 1165, 1168 (6th
Cir. 1974), with Ayres v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 789 F.2d 1173, 1177 (5th Cir. 1986) (ap-
peal by party not named in notice of appeal is permitted in limited instances); Harrison v.
United States, 715 F.2d 1311, 1312-1313 (8th Cir. 1983); Williams v. Frey, 551 F.2d 932,
934 n.1 (3rd Cir. 1977)).
36. Torres, 487 U.S. at 318.
37. Id. at 314.
38. Id. at 315-17.
39. Id. at 314-18.
40. Id. at 317.
41. Id. at 318.
42. FED. R. App. P. 3(c) (sentence added by the 1979 amendments).
43. Torres, 487 U.S. at 315.
44. Torres, 487 U.S. at 315-16.
45. Id. at 315. See also FED. R. App. P. 3 (advisory committee's notes).
46. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986); Masquerade
Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 664 (3d Cir. 1990); Griffith v.Johnston,
899 F.2d 1427. 1429 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 712 (1991); Kowaleski v. Direc-
1992]
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ingly, if a party fails to perfect an appeal as required by Rules 3 and 4,
the court is powerless to invoke its equitable discretion to assist that
party.47 Rules 3 and 4 as construed in Torres, therefore, require the
court "to insist on punctilious, literal, and exact compliance" with the
requirement in Rule 3(c) that the "notice of appeal ... shall specify the
party taking the appeal."'48 Torres and its progeny illustrate the necessity
for lawyers to be familiar with applicable legal procedural rules and to
comply with them. The requirement of Rule 3(c) that the notice of ap-
peal specify the party or parties taking the appeal serves two purposes:
1) finality, in that courts of appeals may not exercise jurisdiction over
unnamed parties after the time for filing notice of appeal has passed;
and 2) fairness, because the requirement provides notice to the opposi-
tion and to the court of the identity of the appellant or appellants.
4 9
IV. PRE-TORRES CASE LAW
A. Strict Compliance with Rule 3(c)
Prior to Torres, several circuits had already interpreted Rule 3(c) to
require strict compliance. In Farley Transportation Co. v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co., 50 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a lit-
eral interpretation of Rule 3(c) created a bright line distinction and
avoided the need to determine which parties were actually before the
court long after the notice of appeal had been filed. 5 1 In Farley, only one
company was named as an appellant, and a related entity was omitted by
clerical error. The Ninth Circuit held that the named company was the
only appellant before the court of appeals. Similarly, in Van Hoose v.
Eidson,5 2 four students were denied relief by the district court in declar-
ing a hair code unconstitutional. The subsequent notice of appeal
named "Van Hoose et al." as the appellants. The Sixth Circuit dismissed
all parties but Van Hoose, holding that "[t]he term et al. does not inform
any other party or any court as to which of the plaintiffs desire to appeal
in this case." 53 In a separate patent infringement case,54 the Sixth Cir-
cuit dismissed an appeal because the notice of appeal named only the
patent licensee and not the patent owner who is the only person having
tor, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs, 879 F.2d 1173, 1174 (3d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 725 F.2d 970, 971 (5th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984); In re Kutner, 656 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982). See also Smith v. White, 857 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1988) (appeal
dismissed sua sponte because untimely).
47. See e.g., Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 664 (3d
Cir. 1990).
48. Kowaleski v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs, 879 F.2d
1173, 1176 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Allen Archery, Inc. v. Precision Shooting Equip. Inc.,
857 F.2d 1176, 1177 (7th Cir. 1988)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990).
49. DeLuca v. Long Island Lighting Co., 862 F.2d 427, 429 (2d Cir. 1988).
50. 778 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1985).
51. Id. at 1369.
52. 450 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1971).
53. Id. at 747.
54. Life Time Doors, Inc. v. Walled Lake Door Co., 505 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1974).
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a claim for infringement.55 Finally, in Covington v. Allsbrook,56 the Fourth
Circuit required actual signing by pro se parties desiring to join in the
appeal noting "[tihe only means of determining which litigants are in-
terested in pursuing an appeal is by requiring each pro se party to per-
sonally sign the notice of appeal."
5 7
B. Liberal Compliance with Rule 3(c)
Prior to Torres, the Fifth, Eighth, Seventh and Third Circuits permit-
ted appeals in limited instances by parties not named in the notice of
appeal.58 The Third Circuit allowed amendments to the notice of ap-
peal despite its own language admonishing attorneys in multi-party
cases to designate, with specificity, which parties were appealing.59 In
exercising jurisdiction over the unnamed parties, each court found there
was no surprise, prejudice or detrimental reliance present.60 Each court
relied upon language such as that cited ih the Advisory Committee
Notes to Rule 3 and in Wright,6 1 which suggest that courts dispense with
literal compliance to the rules. Further, the courts relied upon language
from the United States Supreme Court indicating that the rules are to be
liberally construed and that "mere technicalities" should not stand in
the way of consideration of a case on its merits.6 2 For example, in Foman
v. Davis,63 the district court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint on the
grounds that the oral agreement on which the complaint was based was
unenforceable under the statute of frauds.64 The plaintiff filed a motion
to vacate the judgment and to amend the complaint to assert a right of
recovery in quantum meruit. The district court denied the motion and
the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. 65 The court of appeals dismissed
the appeal from the first judgment because the first notice of appeal was
premature and the second notice did not specify that the plaintiff was
appealing both judgments. 66 The Supreme Court reversed, holding the
55. Id. at 1168.
56. 636 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 914 (1981).
57. Id. at 64. See also, Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam) (competence of a layman representing himself is too limited to allow him to risk
the rights of others by representing them in a class action in which he proceeds pro se).
58. Ayres v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 789 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1986) (notice of appeal
failed to name additional party. The court permitted party to be an appellant noting lack
of prejudice.); Harrison v. United States, 715 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1983) (court recalled its
mandate and allowed the notice of appeal to be amended to add party); Williams v. Frey,
551 F.2d 932, 934 n.1 (3d Cir. 1977) (permitting addition of two unnamed appellants);
Brubaker v. Board of Education, 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965
(1975).
59. Williams v. Frey, 551 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1977) (two unnamed parties added as
appellants); Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 506 F.2d 355, 356-57 n.1 (3d Cir. 1974)
(attorneys in multi-party cases must designate with specificity which parties are appealing
and which are not).
60. E.g., Ayers v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 789 F:2d 1173, 1177 (5th Cir. 1986).
61. See WRIGHT supra note 13.
62. Id.
63. 371 U.S. 178 (1962).
64. Id. at 179.
65. Id.
66. Foman v. Davis, 292 F.2d 85, 87 (1st Cir. 1961), rev'd, 371 U.S. 178 (1962).
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court of appeals read the second notice too narrowly.6 7 The Court rea-
soned that the second notice "did not mislead or prejudice the respon-
dent" and that it was "contrary to the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of such
mere technicalities." 6 8
In Torres, the Court explained that Foman stood for the proposition
that the rules should be liberally construed to determine compliance
with the rules, but failure to comply with the rules can never be harmless
error because a litigant's failure to clear ajurisdictional hurdle can never
be "harmless" or waived by a court.69 The Court explained that the
mandatory nature of the time limit contained in Rule 4 would be vitiated
if courts of appeals were permitted to exercise jurisdiction over parties
not named in the notice of appeal.7 0 Permitting courts to exercise juris-
diction over unnamed parties after expiration of the filing time would be
the equivalent of permitting courts to extend the time for filing the no-
tice of appeal, which is not permitted under the appellate rules.7 1 For
this reason, Torres did not establish a new rule of law, it clarified an ambi-
guity.72 Only those circuits previously allowing amendments to the no-
tice of appeal have experienced a change in the law as a result of
Tortes.
73
V. NOTICE OF APPEAL AFTER TORRES
Once Torres confirmed that proper naming of an appellant in a no-
tice of appeal was a jurisdictional prerequisite, courts of appeals could
no longer open the door retroactively to allow an unnamed appellant to
be added to the notice of appeal. 74 As a result, appellate courts have
searched for ways to aid dilatory appellants who failed to specifically
name all appealing parties in the notice of appeal, struggling to construe
the existing notice of appeal as adequate. Analysis of the cases and par-
ties dismissed due to inadequate party name specifications, reveals that
dismissal occurs most frequently in cases where there are numerous ap-
pellants and an abbreviated form of caption is used to avoid the mun-
dane task of naming each of hundreds of appellants. 7 5 The defects fall
67. Id. at 181.
68. Id.
69. Torres, 487 U.S. at 316-17 n.l.
70. Id. at 315.
71. Id.
72. Akins v. Board of Governors, 867 F.2d 972, 974 (7th Cir. 1988).
73. Allen Archery, Inc. v. Precision Shooting Equip. Inc., 857 F.2d 1176, 1177 (7th
Cir. 1988); See also Akin v. Board. of Governors, 867 F.2d at 974 (Supreme Court re-
manded and directed court of appeals to reconsider earlier judgment that had found no-
tice of appeal adequate).
74. See Santos-Martinez v. Soto-Santiago, 863 F.2d 174, 175 (1st Cir. 1988) (Torres
made clear that the specificity as to who is appealing is a jurisdictional requirement).
75. See, e.g., Storage Technology Corp. v. United States Dist. Court, 934 F.2d 244
(10th Cir. 1991) (only one of 68 appellants named); Baylis v. Marriott Corp., 906 F.2d 874
(2d Cir. 1990) (one of 200 appellants named); In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire
Litig., 888 F.2d 940 (1st Cir. 1989) (over 2,000 plaintiffs appealed but only steering com-
mittee was named); Shatah v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 873 F.2d 550 (2d Cir.
1989) (only first named plaintiff in three of 25 consolidated cases named in notice of ap-
[Vol. 69:4
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into one of four categories: (1) failure to name the party in any fashion
in either the notice of appeal or a functionally equivalent document; (2)
naming the party in some representative capacity as opposed to listing
the name of each individual appellant; (3) use of "et al." together with a
plural designation of plaintiffs or defendants in the body of the notice;
and (4) omission of a name from the notice of appeal, but the name is
present in some other timely filed document which may serve as the
functional equivalent of the notice of appeal.
A. Complete Absence of Appellant's Name
Omitting the appellant's name from the notice is common. Most
courts, however, find that if the appellant's name appears somewhere in
the notice of appeal body or caption, the court has jurisdiction over the
appellant. 76 Appellants who are not named anywhere within the notice
of appeal are considered to have failed to perfect an appeal.
7 7
B. Naming the Appellant in a Representative Capacity
In Brown v. Palmer,78 failure to designate the capacity in which the
party is appealing does not render the notice of appeal ineffective. 79 In
Brown, Peterson Air Force Base Commander James 0. Palmer, and
Colonel Eugene T.M. Cullinane, the Commanding Officer of the Head-
quarters of the Air Forces' 3rd Support Wing, were sued in their official
capacities. Plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctions allowing them to at-
tend an open house on Peterson Air Force Base and sought declaration
that bar letters issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1382 violated the First
Amendment. The notice of appeal read "Joan Brown et al., Plaintiff-
peal) Gonzalez-Vega v. Hernandez-Colon, 866 F.2d 519 (1st Cir. 1989) (one appellant
named and the remaining 143 represented by et al.).
76. Tri-Crown, Inc. v. American Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 908 F.2d 578, 580 (10th Cir.
1990) (party named in caption not required to be named in the body; caption should be
looked at as part of the entire notice); Mariani-Giron v. Acevedo-Ruiz, 877 F.2d 1114,
1116 (Ist Cir. 1989) (caption should be looked at as part of the entire notice). Butsee Pride
v. Venango River Corp., 916 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1696 (1991)
(naming a party in the caption of the notice of appeal or in collateral documents does not
satisfy the specificity requirement of Rule 3(c)); Bigby v. City of Chicago, 871 F.2d 54, 57
(7th Cir. 1989) Allen Archery Inc. v. Precision Shooting Equip. Inc., 857 F.2d 1176, 1177
(7th Cir. 1988).
77. Pratt v. Petroleum Prod. Management, Inc., 920 F.2d 651, 655 (10th Cir. 1990)
(only the named company properly appealed); Barnett v. Petro-Tex Chemical Corp., 893
F.2d 800, 805 (5th Cir. 1990) (body of timely filed notice of appeal named only one party;
court held he was the only appellant and therefore refused to exercise jurisdiction over the
appeals of 56 other parties); Main-Piazza v. Aponte-Roque, 873 F.2d 432, 433 (1st Cir.
1989) (only the party named in the notice of appeal is properly before the court); DeLuca
v. Long Island Lighting Co., 862 F.2d 427,429 (2d Cir. 1988) (judgment imposed Rule 11
sanctions against attorney; notice of appeal was filed in the name of the client; award of
sanctions runs only to the attorney as the party in interest and therefore the attorney must
appeal in his or her own name); In re Woosley, 855 F.2d 687, 688 (10th Cir. 1988) (Torres
is controlling. An unnamed appellant fails to appeal); See also Riggs v. Scrivner, Inc., 927
F.2d 1146 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 196 (1991) (court lacked jurisdiction
over attorney against whom sanctions had been imposed since notice failed to list the
name of the attorney).
78. 915 F.2d 1435 (10th Cir. 1990), aff'd reh'g, 944 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1991).
79. Id. at 1439-40.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
Appellee v. Colonel James 0. Palmer et al. Defendants-Appellant." 8 0
The notice of appeal did not indicate whether Colonel Palmer was filing
the appeal in his official capacity or as commander of Peterson Air Force
Base. 8 ' The Tenth Circuit held that the United States had perfected its
appeal because the appellee and the court had the requisite fair notice of
the specific individuals or entities seeking to appeal.8 2 Further, the
court held that the appellees clearly understood that an appeal by Colo-
nel Palmer was in effect an appeal by the United States. The court rea-
soned that since the appellees had sued Colonel Palmer and Colonel
Cullinane only in their official capacity, designation of one or the other
was sufficient to perfect the appeal by the United States.
8 3
In King v. Otasco, Inc.,8 4 a father failed to specify in the notice of
appeal that he brought the suit individually and on behalf of his chil-
dren. The Fifth Circuit found that the children did not sue as independ-
ent parties and, therefore, the case did not concern itself with the
omission of a party from the notice of appeal but rather a party's failure
to designate all the capacities in which the suit was brought.8 5 Because
Mr. King was in fact the appellant, suing on behalf of himself and his
children, the notice properly warns of a pending appeal.8 6 However,
the named appellant must truly be acting in a representative capacity.
The designation "partnership" is insufficient to confer jurisdiction over
individual partners. In McLemore v. Landry, 8 7 River Villa was a partner-
ship composed of fifteen partners. Landry, one of River Villa's partners,
acted as an agent and an attorney in fact for River Villa and all but three
of the partners in certain land transactions. When the partnership de-
faulted on the loans securing the land transactions, the lender sued and
a judgment was entered in its favor.8 8 The parternership's notice of ap-
peal read, "[C]omes River Villa, A Partnership, and the respective indi-
vidual partners therein, defendants.., and moves this Court to allow an
appeal .... ",89 The Fifth Circuit held that the notice of appeal con-
ferred the court's jurisdiction solely over River Villa, the partnership.
The court stated:
80. Failure to name appellees is immaterial because FED. R. App. P. 3(c) does not
require specificity in naming the appellees. See, e.g., International Union, United Auto.,
Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v. United Screw & Bolt Corp., 941 F.2d 466 (6th
Cir. 1991); Haas v. Farmers Ins. Group, 930 F.2d 33 (10th Cir. 1991); Longmire v. Guste,
921 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1991); Chathas v. Smith, 884 F.2d 980, 986 n.3 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) requires specificity of appellants and does not require appellees to be
specified), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1095 (1990). But see Kinnell v. Roberts, 931 F.2d 63 (10th
Cir. 1991) (only two named appellees were parties to the appeal).
81. Brown, 915 F.2d at 1439.
82. Id.
83. Id See also Battle v. Anderson, 946 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1991) (official capacity
suits are an exception to the general rule of Torres); King v. Otasco, Inc., 861 F.2d 438, 443
(5th Cir. 1988) (failure to designate the capacity in which a party appeals does not render
notice of appeal ineffective).
84. 861 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1988).
85. Id. at 443.
86. Id.
87. 898 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1990).
88. Id. at 999.
89. Id.
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[T]his case demonstrates the problem inherent in assuming
that a generic designation, without more, automatically covers
all persons ostensibly aligned on one side of litigation. River
Villa is composed of 15 partners. Interplan Development, Inc.,
of which Landry is president, is one. As noted, it was named as
a third-party defendant by River Villa. Its interests obviously
are not consistent with the interests of the other partners.
90
In Kowaleski v. Department of Labor,9 1 Peter Kowaleski sued for black
lung benefits. Although Kowaleski's wife Anna died five years prior to
initiation of the suit, an Administrative Law Judge inexplicably entered
the order "Anna Kowaleski, widow of Peter Kowaleski" as the claim-
ant.92 Upon loosing the suit, Mr. Kowaleski filed a notice of appeal in
the name of "Anna Kowaleski, widow of Peter Kowaleski." While noting
that Anna Kowaleski could not be Peter Kowaleski's' widow because she
had predeceased him, the appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack
of a real party in interest since Peter Kowaleski died in the interim and
the benefits could only be awarded to, the claimant or a survivor of the
claimant. Unfortunately, Kowaleski's attorney was not permitted to
amend the notice to change the name of the appellant to Charles
Kowaleski, son of Peter Kowaleski.
93
In certified class actions, the designated representative of the class
may be named in the notice of appeal. 94 In Al-Jundi v. Estate of Rockefel-
ler, 95 the court upheld an appeal by the entire class,, although the notice
of appeal named only Al-Jundi as the appellant. The court held that the
other members of the class were designated by implication since the
amended complaint listed all plaintiffs as representatives of the plain-
tiffs' class. The Second Circuit found that both the Estate of Rockefeller




Post-Torres courts of appeal have dealt with innumerable designa-
tions, other than specifically naming the individual or entities, which ar-
guably give fair notice of the specific individual or entity seeking to
90. I.d at 1000 n.6. See also Dalton Dev. Project v. Unsecured Creditors Comm., 948
F.2d 678 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that each partnership must be specifically named in the
notice of appeal); Wise v. Parkman, 932 F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1991) (inclusion of Sheriff's
name acting in official capacity was insufficient to confer 'jurisdiction over the county,
where state law did not give the sheriff authority to appeal judgments against the county).
See also United States v. Spurgeon, 861 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1988) (no person asserting
the interest of the trust, nor the trust were named as appellants, trust failed to appeal).
91. 879 F.2d 1173 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990).
92. Id. at 1174.
93. Id.
94. See e.g., AlJundi v. Estate of Rockefeller, 885 F.2d 1060, 1060 n.1 (2d Cir. 1989);
Renden v. AT&T Technologies, 883 F.2d 388, 398 n.8 (5th Cir. 1989). See also Cotton v.
U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 856 F.2d 158, 161 (11 th Cir. 1988) (certified class had settled,
only named appellants Cotton and Herod were proper appellants).
95. 885 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir. 1989).
96. Id. at 1061 (citing King v. Otasco Inc., .861 F.2d 438, 442-43 (5th Cir. 1988)).
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appeal. The Torres court stated that "the specificity requirement of Rule
3(c) is met only by some designation that gives fair notice of the specific
individual or entity seeking to appeal."
'9 7
In Laidley v. McClain,98 only one of four plaintiffs was named in the
notice of appeal followed by the "et al." designation. The Tenth Circuit
dismissed the remaining unnamed plaintiffs for lack of jurisdiction. 99
Similarly, in Pratt v. Petroleum Production Mgmt., Inc. Employee Savings Plan
& Trust, 10 0 the caption contained what the court referred to as "the
troublesome et al. designation."10 lIn Pratt, the caption named only "Pe-
troleum Production Management Employees Savings Plan et al." as the
appellant, and the body of the notice stated "[n]otice is hereby given
that Petroleum Production Management Inc. Employee Savings Plan
and Trust et al., defendants above named hereby appeal .... -"102 The
Tenth Circuit, citing Laidley as its most extensive analysis of Torres, re-
jected the argument that the use of the plural "defendants" gave fair
notice of the entity seeking to appeal. 10 3 In support of its decision, the
Tenth Circuit cited the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Minority Employees v.
Tennessee Dept. of Employee Security 10 4 and the First Circuit's opinion in
Rosario-Torres v. Hernandez-Colon.105
In Minority Employees, the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc reversed its
holding in Ford v. Nicks, 106 finding that a named corporate appellant fol-
lowed by the et al. designation was inadequate identification of the par-
ties and therefore inconsistent with Torres.'0 7 As long as the party
names appeared anywhere on the face of the notice of appeal it might be
sufficient although it is preferable that the name of each party appear in
the body of the notice itself.' 0 8 In Rosario-Torres, only one of nine appel-
lants was named in the notice of appeal.' 0 9 Although the body of the
notice stated "[niotice is hereby given that plaintiffs through their un-
dersigned attorneys, appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit from the final judgment entered in the case of caption,"
the First Circuit found that only Miguel Rosario-Torres, the one appel-
lant named in the caption, was properly before the court.1 10 The First
Circuit stated unequivocally that inserting the words et al. can not fulfill
the mandate of Rule 3(c) and for this reason the notice is wholly inade-
97. Torres, 487 U.S. at 318.
98. 914 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1990).
99. Id. at 1388.
100. 920 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1990).
101. Id at 654.
102. Ia
103. Id at 655.
104. 901 F.2d 1327 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 210 (1990).
105. 889 F.2d 314 (1st Cir. 1989) (en banc).
106. 866 F.2d 865 (6th Cir. 1989) (however inartful the "et al." designation may be in
identifying the defendants in addition to Nicks, when read with the words "the defend-
ants" in the body of the notice, the notice satisfactorily communicates that Nicks and the
other defendants from the court below are appealing).
107. Minority Employees, 901 F.2d at 1332.
108. Id. at 1335.
109. Rosario-Torres, 889 F.2d at 317.
110. Id.
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quate as to the identification of the remaining plaintiffs.I1 1
When courts reject the use of the troublesome term "et al.," there
is often a factual basis for their denial peculiar to the circumstances of
the case. In Torres, the Supreme Court stated:
The purpose of the specificity requirement of Rule 3(c) is to
provide notice both to the opposition and to the court of the
identity of the appellant or appellants. The use of the phrase
"et al.," which literally means 'and others' utterly fails to pro-
vide such notice to either intended recipient. Permitting such
vague designation would leave the appellee and the court un-
able to determine with certitude whether a losing party not
named in the notice of appeal should be bound by an adverse
judgment or held liable for costs or sanctions.
1 12
This language could be construed as rejecting. any use of the phrase et
al., however, the plaintiffs in Torres purported to proceed on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated even though no class was certi-
fied. In Torres, the et al. could have referred to a large class of unnamed
individuals or only a few. The Supreme Court did not make this distinc-
tion but the Fifth Circuit has so interpreted Torres.
113
In Storage Technology, the caption of the notice of appeal recited the
name of the appellants as "Comite Pro Rescate, et al, defendants-appel-
lants."' 114 The body of the notice of appeal stated: "Comite Pro
Rescate de la Salud, et al., and all the Defendants of record herein, ap-
peal to the District Court for the District of Colorado .... ,"115 The
district court declined to dismiss the unnamed appellants, finding there
was no ambiguity in the notice of appeal. The Tenth Circuit issued a
writ of mandamus to dismiss all unnamed appellants, holding that pre-
cedent dictates 1 6 that each appealing party must be specifically named
in the notice of appeal or a functionally equivalent document properly
listing the appealing parties and filed within the appeal period. 1 7 Here,
the list of defendants in the body of the notice was not helpful because
of the three complaints filed, no two listed the same defendants. "Thus,
the reviewing court is left to somehow determine the identity of 'all the
Defendants of record herein' absent any clear point of reference. The
mischief created by this approach is exactly what Torres sought to elimi-
nate by the requirement of listing the appealing parties."
' 18
111. Id-
112. Torres, 487 U.S. at 318.
113. Pope v. Mississippi Real Estate Comm'n, 872 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1989) (only
two plaintiffs existed below, therefore, the et al. caption on the notice of appeal coupled
with "plaintiffs do hearby appeal" in the body of the notice is sufficient identification of the
parties).
114. Storage Technology, 934 F.2d at 246.
115. Id. at 245.
116. See Hubbert v. City of Moore, 923 F.2d 769, 772 (10th Cir. 1991); Laidley v. Mc-
Clain, 914 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1990); Pratt v. Petroleum Prod. Management Employees
Say. Plan & Trust, 920 F.2d 651, 655 (10th Cir. 1990).
117. Storage Technology, 934 F.2d at 248.
118. Id.
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In Santos-Martinez v. Soto-Santiago, 119 the First Circuit explained that
et al. was inadequate under circumstances where, although the notice
was purportedly filed on behalf of all plaintiffs, two of the plaintiffs vol-
untarily withdrew and the claims of a third plaintiff were not mentioned
anywhere in the appellants' brief.120 Accordingly, the court held that it
lacked jurisdiction over the appeals of the three remaining unnamed ap-
pellants who purportedly sought to appeal. 12 1 In Gonzalez-Vega v. Her-
nandez-Colon,122 the First Circuit again rejected the use of the
designation et al., but explained, "[a]s defendants point out, the show-
ing made below in the summary judgment proceedings was weak or
nonexistent as to some plaintiffs' claims making it all the more conceiva-
ble that fewer than all plaintiffs had decided to appeal."'
123
In Griffith v. Johnston,124 the Fifth Circuit indicated that four excep-
tions exist where the use of et al. would suffice for purposes of the notice
of appeal: (1) where only two parties are named in the lawsuit; (2) when
the notice lists only the representative in a class action; (3) where par-
ents sue on behalf of their children; and (4) a functional equivalent of
the notice is filed in a timely manner. 125 A description of each excep-
tion follows. First, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that if only two parties are
named in the lawsuit, the use of et al. would clearly refer to the unnamed
party. 12 6 Critical to the Fifth Circuit's analysis is that there be only one
appellant to which the "et al." could be referring. In Torres for example,
all defendants were specifically named except Jose Torres. If Jose
Torres was the only unnamed appellant, under the Fifth Circuit's rea-
soning in Pope v. Mississippi Real Estate Comm 'n, 12 7 the et al. designation
could only refer to Jose Torres. Torres is distinguished by the Fifth Cir-
cuit, however, because the plaintiffs purported to proceed on behalf of
themselves and other persons similarly situated. Although the phrase et
al. translates literally to "and others," the designation in Torres could
have referred to a large class of unnamed individuals as well as, or in-
stead of, Jose Torres. 12 8 The Fifth Circuit noted that in the case before
it there were only two plaintiffs, James and Mary Pope, and the body of
the notice of appeal used plural "plaintiffs" which could only include
119. 863 F.2d 174 (lst Cir. 1988).
120. Id. at 175-76.
121. Id. at 176.
122. 866 F.2d 519 (1st Cir. 1989).
123. Id. at 520.
124. 899 F.2d 1427 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, II S. Ct. 712 (1991).
125. Id. at 1430.
126. See, e.g., Chandler v. Barncastle, 919 F.2d 23, 25-26 (5th Cir. 1990) (use of et al. is
sufficient in the limited context of a two-party action where one of the parties is named,
since et al. can refer only to the one unnamed party); Pope v. Mississippi Real Estate
Comm'n, 872 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1989) (where there are only two plaintiffs in the case
et al. could only refer to the unnamed plaintiff). The use of the designation et ux. which
means "and wife" has similarly been found to refer to an unnamed plaintiff. See, e.g., Mila-
novich v. Costa Crociere, 938 F.2d 297, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Sweger v. Texaco, Inc., 930
F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1991).
127. 872 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1989).
128. Id. at 129.
[Vol. 69:4
PARTY NAMES ON THE NOTICE OF APPEAL
James and Mary Pope. 129 Accordingly, in the limited context of a two
party action, the Fifth Circuit distinguished Torres and found that the et
al. designation could only refer to Mary Pope.
Second, the notice of appeal may list only the class action represen-
tative. In Rendon v. AT&T Technologies,' 30 the notice of appeal desig-
nated "Gilbert Rendon, et al.," as the appellant.' 3 ' AT&T argued that
the phrase et al. gave no notice of the party seeking appeal. The Fifth
Circuit disagreed, holding that while AT&T's argument may have merit
where no class certification exists, the specificity requirements of Rule
3(c), as strictly construed in Torres, do not apply in actions where a class
has been certified.' 3 2 The court reasoned that since Rendon was desig-
nated the class representative below, his actions bound the entire class
and, therefore, the et al. designation was sufficient to bring the certified
class of plaintiffs under the court's jurisdiction.'
33
Third, parents can sue on their own behalf and on behalf of their
children.'34 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that when parents sue on their
own behalf and on behalf of their children, the et al. designation pre-
serves the appeal, because the opposing party could anticipate that the
parents would appeal in both their individual and their representative
capacities. 135 Finally, when the notice of appeal defectively employs the
et al. designation, the appellants can file a functionally equivalent docu-
ment within the 30 day deadline provided by Appellate Rule 4.136 Be-
cause there can be no ambiguity as to the identity of the appellants, the
safest route is to specifically name each appellant.' 3 7 Three circuits,
129. Id.
130. 883 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1989).
131. Id. at 398 n.8.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. King v. Otasco Inc., 861 F.2d 438, 443 (5th Cir. 1988).
135. Id.
136. Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen v. Atkinson, T. & S.F. Ry., 894 F.2d 1463, 1465 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 131 (1990).
137. Hubbert v. City of Moore, Okla. 923 F.2d 769, 772 (10th Cir. 1991); Pratt v. Pe-
troleum Prod. Management, Inc. Employee Savings Plan & Trust, 920 F.2d 651, 654 (10th
Cir. 1990); Laidley v. McClain, 914 F.2d 1386, 1389 (10th Cir. 1990); Tri-Crown, Inc. v.
American Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 908 F.2d 578, 580 (10th Cir. 1990). See, e.g., Walter v.
Int. Ass'n of Machinists Pension Fund, 949 F.2d 310, 312-13 (10th Cir. 1991); Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Sonny's Old Land Corp., 937 F.2d 128, 129 (5th Cir. 1991); Chennareddy
v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d 315, 318 n.2, (D.C. Cir. 1991); Biros v. Spalding-Evenflo Co., 934
F.2d 740, 742 (6th Cir. 1991); Pontarelli v. Stone, 930 F.2d 104, 108-109 (Ist Cir. 1991);
Moran v. Farrier, 924 F.2d 134, 136-37 (8th Cir. 1991); Samaad v. Dallas, 922 F.2d 216,
219 (5th Cir. 1991); Rivera v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 921 F.2d 393, 395 (1st Cir. 1990);
United States v. Tucson Mechanical Contracting, Inc., 921 F.2d 911, 913-14 (9th Cir.
1990); Delancey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 918 F.2d 491, 493 (5th Cir. 1990);
Baylor v. United States Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 913 F.2d 223, 224-25 (5th Cir.
1990); Barnett v. Petro-Tex Chem. Corp., 893 F.2d 800, 805 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 3274 (1990); Rosario-Torres v. Hernandez-Colon, 889 F.2d 314, 317 (1st Cir. 1989)
(the notice of appeal was sufficient to bring only the one named appellant before the court;
remaining eight plaintiffs failed to appeal); Mariani-Giron v. Acevedo-Ruiz, 877 F.2d 1114,
1116 (1st Cir. 1989); Shatah v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 873 F.2d 550 (2d Cir.
1989) (twenty-five cases were consolidated for pre-trial purposes, notice of appeal named
only first named plaintiff in three of the actions; all unnamed appellants failed to appeal);
Gonzalez-Vega v. Hernandez-Colon, 866 F.2d 519, 519-20 (1st Cir. 1989) (only one of
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however, have accepted generic designations finding there was no ambi-
guity under the particular facts of the case. 13 8
In National Center for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. Immigration & Naturali-
zation Service,' 3 9 the Ninth Circuit considered whether the term "defend-
ants" fairly indicated that all and not just some of the defendants were
appealing. 14 0 The Ninth Circuit held that Torres did not require that the
individual names of the appealing parties be listed "in instances in which
a generic term, such as plaintiffs or defendants, adequately identifies
them."' 14 1 In so holding, the Ninth Circuit relied on the Sixth Circuit's
opinion in Ford,14 2 which the Sixth Circuit had since overruled with Mi-
nority Employees. 14 3 With the decision in Adkins v. United Mine Workers, 14 4
however, the Sixth Circuit has recently clarified Minority Employees and
accepted a generic designation of appellants.14 5 In Adkins, the Sixth Cir-
cuit distinguished Minority Employees in that its notice of appeal failed to
indicate more than one appellant. In Adkins, the notice of appeal ade-
quately alerted defendants that "all the plaintiffs" to the action below
sought to appeal.
14 6
The Ninth Circuit has continued to rely on the reasoning of Ford
and accept designations of the plural of defendant or plaintiff. In Cam-
mack v. Waihee,14 7 the caption read "Nell A. Cammack, et al.," and the
body stated "plaintiffs above-named hereby appeal .... -14 8 The court
relying on Ford, found that a bare reference to the plural plaintiffs in the
body of the notice, coupled with the use of et al. in the caption, clearly
indicated the plaintiffs' intention was that all of the plaintiffs be included
in the appeal.149 The court found that in order for the court to have
jurisdiction over the unnamed parties, the et al. designation in the cap-
tion must be coupled with the use of the plural term of plaintiffs or de-
144 plaintiffs was named in the notice of appeal, therefore the court had jurisdiction only
over the appeal of the named party). But see, Adkins v. United Mine Workers, 941 F.2d 392
(6th Cir. 1991) (6th Cir. 1991) (court refused to dismiss appeal on jurisdictional grounds
where the body of the notice made specific reference to "all of the plaintiffs" named in the
complaint), reh'g denied (en banc), [1991 U.S. App. Lexis 266291,petitionforcert. filed,Jan. 2,
1992; Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1991).
138. Adkins v. United Mine Workers, 941 F.2d 382 (6th Cir. 1991) (all the plaintiffs to
this action as set out in the complaint which has been filed herein as well as in all amend-
ments thereto) reh 'g denied (en banc), [1991 U.S. App. Lexis 26629J, petitionfor cert.filed,Jan.
2, 1992; Baylis v. Marriott, 906 F.2d 874 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 210 (1990) (body
of notice of appeal referenced "all of the plaintiffs in the action"); National Center for
Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 892 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.
1989) (appellants referred to as defendants).
139. 892 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1989).
140. Id. at 815.
141. Id. at 816-17.
142. 866 F.2d at 865.
143. 901 F.2d at 1327.
144. 941 F.2d 392 (6th Cir.), reh'ddenied, (en banc) [1991 U.S. App. Lexis 26629] (6th
Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed, Jan. 2, 1992.
145. Id. at 397.
146. Id.
147. 932 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1991).
148. Id. at 768.
149. Id. at 768-69. See also Montes v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 531, 534 n.3 (9th Cir.
1990).
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fendants in the body of the notice. 150 One without the other will not
suffice.
Use of the plurals defendants or plaintiffs, coupled with the "et al."
designation in the caption will not suffice in the First, Seventh, Eighth
and Tenth Circuits.15 1 In Baylis v. Marriott Corp.,152 the plaintiffs ap-
pealed from a final judgment dismissing their complaint against Marriott
Corporation for alleged tortious inducement of breach of the plaintiffs
collective bargaining agreement with their employer. The caption of the
notice of appeal was styled "James Baylis, et al.," [sic] and stated that
"James Baylis, et al., [sic] all of the plaintiffs in this action, hereby appeal
: . . .- 53 Marriott moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate
jurisdiction as to all plaintiffs other than Baylis. The Second Circuit
concluded that the notice of appeal was adequate to give it jurisdiction
over all of the plaintiffs. It found that "the body of the notice contained
a precise indication as to which parties sought to appeal, since it stated
that the appeal was being taken by 'all of the plaintiffs in this action.'
Thus, the ambiguity of 'et al.' was resolved."' 5 4 In a confusing explana-
tion, the court stated that "[w]e conclude that the specification that the
appeal was taken by 'all of the plaintiffs in this action' was the functional
equivalent of a plaintiff-by-plaintiff listing."' 5 5
D. The Notice of Appeal Can Never Be the Functional Equivalent of a Notice
of Appeal
In Torres, the Supreme Court held that if a litigant files papers in a
fashion that is technically at variance with the letter of a procedural rule,
a court may nonetheless find that the litigant has complied with the rule
if the litigant's action is the functional equivalent of what the rule re-
quires. 156 "The notice of appeal can never be the functional equivalent
of a notice of appeal."' 57 Either the notice of appeal is sufficient or not.
150. See United States v. Tucson Mechanical Contracting, 921 F.2d 911, 914-15 (9th
Cir. 1990) (Although the caption contained the "et al." designation, the body stated that
only one of the defendants appealed. The court found that the use of"et al." contradicted
the use of the singular in the text of the notice and therefore it had jurisdiction only over
the party specifically named in the notice.); Sauceda v. Washington Dep't of Labor & In-
dus., 917 F.2d 1216, 1218 (9th Cir. 1990) (Caption of appellants' notice of appeal specifi-
cally named five of the six plaintiffs and the body stated that "plaintiffs, each of them,
hereby appeal." The court found that to have jurisdiction over the appeal of the omitted
plaintiff, the plural designation in the body must be coupled with an "et al." designation in
the caption).
151. Storage Technology Corp. v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Colo; 934
F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1991); Pratt v. Petroleum Prod. Management, Inc., Employee Sav. Plan
& Trust, 920 F.2d 651, 654 (10th Cir. 1990); Laidley v. McClain, 914 F.2d 1386, 1389
(10th Cir. 1990); Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203,1206 (8th Cir. 1990); Rosario-
Torres v. Hernandez-Colon, 889 F.2d 314, 317 (Ist Cir. 1989); Akins v. Board of Gover-
nors of State Colleges and Universities, 867 F.2d 972, 973-74 (7th Cir. 1988).
152. 906 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1990).
153. Id. at 876.
154. Id. at 877.
155. Id.
156. Torres, 487 U.S. at 316-317, citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988).
157. Allen Archery, Inc. v. Precision Shooting Equip., 857 F.2d 1176, 1177 (7th Cir.
1988).
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If it is not, but some other document filed with the court within the 30
day time limit for filing a notice of appeal under Rule 4(a)(1) clarifies
who the appellant is, that document may serve as the functional
equivalent of a notice of appeal.
The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in Smith v.
Barry, 15 8 that some document filed with the court within the deadline for
filing a notice of appeal may serve as the functional equivalent of a no-
tice of appeal. 159 Although in Smith the functionally equivalent docu-
ment was a brief, the circuits were split on the question of whether an
appellate brief may serve as the notice of appeal required by Rule 3.160
The Court reiterated that satisfaction that Rule 's requirements are a
jurisdictional prerequisite but that a brief could constitute the functional
equivalent of a notice of appeal if the brief met all the prerequisites of
Rule 3.161 The Court remanded Smith for a determination of whether
the brief contained all the information required by Rule 3(c). If so, it
was the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal without regard to the
appellant's motive.
16 2
The Tenth Circuit held in Hubbert v. City of Moore, 16 that defects in
the notice of appeal may be remedied by filing other documents supply-
ing the omitted information. 164 The appellants in Hubbert filed a docket-
ing statement specifically identifying each appellant within 30 day limit.
The Tenth Circuit found that this docketing statement cured the defec-
tive notice of appeal. 165 Such a timely filing of the correction is distin-
guished from Laidley v. McClain 16 6 where the docketing statement was
filed after the time for filing the notice of appeal had expired. In Hub-
bert, the Tenth Circuit cited with approval, Masquerade Novelty, Warfeld,
and Brotherhood of Railway Carmen.
16 7
158. 112 S. Ct. 678 (1992).
159. Id. at 682.
160. Id. at 681 (citing Smith v. Galley, 919 F.2d 893, 895 (4th Cir. 1990)) (informal
brief is not the functional equivalent of the notice of appeal that FED. R. App. P. 3 re-
quires), rev'd sub nom., Smith v. Barry, 112 S. Ct. 678 (1992); Jurgens v. McKasy, 905 F.2d
382, 385 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (appellate brief cannot substitute for notice of appeal);
United States v. Cooper, 876 F.2d 1192, 1196, (5th Cir. 1989) (appellate brief will not
substitute for a notice of appeal even if it otherwise meets the requirements of FED. R. App.
P. 3 and 4); Allah v. Superior Court of State of California, 871 F.2d 887, 889-90 (9th Cir.
1989) (brief treated as notice of appeal); Finch v. City of Vernon, 845 F.2d 256, 259-60
(I th Cir. 1988) (brief treated as notice of appeal); Frace v. Russell, 341 F.2d 901, 903 (3d
Cir.) (treating brief as notice of appeal), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 863 (1965).
161. Smith, 112 S. Ct. at 682.
162. Id.
163. 923 F.2d 769 (10th Cir. 1991).
164. Id. at 772.
165. Id. See also Walter v. International Ass'n of Machinists Pension Fund, 949 F.2d
310, 312-13 (10th Cir. 1991) (in conformance with Hubbert, a docketing statement filed
outside the time for filing an appeal will not suffice). But see Persyn v. United States, 935
F.2d 69, 71-2 (5th Cir. 1991) (a docketing statement prepared by the clerk and not the
party is not the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal because the Rule requires a
party to file the document).
166. 914 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1990).
167. Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., 912 F.2d 663, 664-65 (3d Cir. 1990);
Warfield v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 904 F.2d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1990); Brotherhood of
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In Masquerade Novelty, 1 68 the notice of appeal stated: "Walter Z.
Steinman, Attorney for Plaintiff in the above captioned matter hereby
appeals."' 69 The Third Circuit raised jurisdiction sua sponte noting
that the notice of appeal could possibly be read as indicating that the
attorney, rather than his client, was appealing. Because the district
court's order adversely affected only the client Masquerade Novelty, the
court considered whether it, in fact, had jurisdiction over Masquerade
Novelty as an unnamed appellant. The Third Circuit held that a party
will be deemed to have complied with Rule 3(c) if it has, within the time
period provided to file an appeal, filed documents that specify the party
or parties taking the appeal. 170 At oral argument on the court's motion,
which questioned whether or not the notice of appeal was sufficient, the
appellants drew the court's attention to two other documents identifying
the appellants, both of which had been filed within the 30 day dead-
line.17 1 The court noted that it did not concern itself with the nature of
the collateral documents so long as they were filed within the time pe-
riod. 17 2 Previously, the Third Circuit in Dura Systems, Inc. v. Rothbury
Investments, Ltd. '7 3 had confronted a situation where the notice of appeal
did not name all the appellants, but a Consent Decree filed within the
time period for filing a notice of appeal had identified all the appellants.
The court held that the Consent Decree served as the "functional
equivalent" of what the rules required. The court went on to hold that
by upholding the Consent Decree as a functional equivalent it was fol-
lowing the United States Supreme Court's directive to construe the rules
"liberally" and to avoid a construction that would allow "mere techni-
calities" to bar consideration of a case on the merits.
174
In Brotherhood of Railway Carmen 175 the Fifth Circuit found that the
notice of appeal named only one of five appealing unions. Nonetheless,
within the time for filing the notice of appeal, the appellants had filed a
Memorandum in Support of a Motion for Preliminary Injunction which
named all six unions. This memorandum served as a functional
equivalent of the notice of appeal. 176 In Allen Archery, Inc. v. Precision
Shooting Equipment,17 7 the court considering the Torres functional
Ry. Carmen v Atkinson, T. & S.F. Ry., 894 F.2d 1463, 1465 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct
131 (1990).
168. 912 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1990).
169. Id. at 664.
170. Id. at 665.
171. Id. at 664-65.
172. Id. at 665.
173. 886 F.2d 551 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1046 (1990).
174. Id. at 555, citing Torres, 487 U.S. 312 (1988) and Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
181 (1962).
175. 894 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 131 (1990).
176. See also Board of Educ. v. United States, 920 F.2d 370 (6th Cir. 1990) (107 plain-
tiffs named in plaintiffs' complaint were incorporated in the notice of appeal); Warfield v.
Fidelity and Deposit Co., 904 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1990); Page v. Delaune, 837 F.2d 233 (5th
Cir. 1988). But see Allen Archery Inc. v. Precision Shooting Equip. Inc., 857 F.2d 1176 (7th
Cir. 1988) (the appellant must be named in the notice of appeal; naming him in documents
such as a supersedeas bond filed in district court will not do).
177. 857 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1988).
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equivalent language, stated that "[it] is designed for the case where the
litigant fails to file a notice of appeal, but files another paper that is its
functional equivalent. It is not designed for the case where the litigant
has filed a notice of appeal and failed to name the appellants.
1 78
VI. APPLICATION OF TORRES UNDER FED. R. APP. P. 15 AND FED. R.
BANK. P. 8001
A petition seeking review and enforcement of orders of administra-
tive agencies, boards, commissions and officers must contain the same
specificity as the notice of appeal.1 79 The Tenth Circuit applies Torres in
bankruptcy matters. In Storage Technology, the court found "[t]hat the
requirements for filing a notice of appeal under Bankruptcy Rule
8001(a) are more strict than those of Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)." 18 0 Contrary
to the Sixth Circuit's distinction in Adkins,1 8 1 however, this was not the
basis for the Tenth Circuit's decision. The notice of appeal was ambigu-
ous and would not have sufficed even under Rule 3(c). 18 2 In Citizens
Bank & Trust Co. v. Case,a8 3 however, the Fifth Circuit found that the
specificity requirement set out in Torres is inapplicable to a notice of ap-
peal from a bankruptcy court judgment or order.18 4 The case is distin-
guishable because the appeal involved sanctions entered against the
attorney and the party.' 8 5 Because the party was also sanctioned and
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8001 requires that the notice of appeal contain the
name of the parties to the judgment the Court held that naming the
party sufficed to bring the issues before the district court.18 6
VII. CONCLUSION
No practitioner having read this article, would fail to specifically
name each and every appellant, when failure to do so jeopardizes a
party's appeal. There is, however, slim hope for those who are currently
in the position of having filed a defective notice of appeal because, as
this article demonstrates, some designations short of specifically naming
178. Id.
179. FED. R. App. P. 15, Goos v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 911 F.2d 1283, 1288
(8th Cir. 1990); Kowaleski v. Department of Labor, 879 F.2d 1173, 1176 (3d Cir. 1989)
(Rule 15(a) requires same "punctilious, literal and exact compliance" as that mandated in
Torres for Rules 3 and 4); Arnow v. United States Nuclear Reg Comm'n, 868 F.2d 223, 225
(7th Cir. 1989).
180. Id. at 247. See also Concorde Resources, Inc. v. Woosley, 855 F.2d 687, 688 (10th
Cir. 1988); Certified Class in The Chartered Securities Litigation v. The Charter Co., 92
Bankr. 510, 514 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
181. Adkins, 941 F.2d at 398.
182. See Adkins, 941 F.2d at 400 n.1 (dissenting opinion).
183. 937 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1991).
184. Id. at 1020.
185. Ordinarily the sanctioned attorney is the real party in interest and must be named
in the notice of appeal. F.T.C. v. Amy Travel Service, Inc., 894 F.2d 879, 880-81 (7th Cir.
1989) (court had no jurisdiction over sanctioned attorney not named in notice of appeal);
Rogers v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 557, 560 (7th Cir. 1988) (sanctioned attorney
is real party in interest and must appeal in his own name); DeLuca v. Long Island Lighting
Co., 862 F.2d 427, 429 (2d Cir. 1988).
186. Citizens Bank, 937 F.2d at 1021.
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can suffice. As Torres and its progeny come to the attention of more
practitioners, the requirement of Rule 3(c) that the notice of appeal
specify the parties appealing should cease to be an issue for the courts to
address.

